MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THE SPEECH:

SUCCESS DEPENDS ON FAILURE

- A Resolution Process for Financial Firms
- Assistance for Continental Illinois
- Swedish Response to 1990s Banking Crisis
- References

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A Resolution Process for Financial Firms

- The United States is in the middle of a serious financial crisis, and the economy is under significant stress. While there has been a lot of debate about how to revive the economy and restore financial stability, there is broad agreement that the economy will not recover until the financial system is stabilized and credit starts flowing more normally.

- The recovery of the financial system depends critically on the public regaining trust and confidence in financial institutions, particularly the largest financial institutions. The public’s confidence in the largest institutions has been seriously shaken by the risks they have taken, the poor management of those risks and the resulting losses. Thus, the restoration of normal financial market activity depends importantly on how the problems of the largest bank and nonbank financial institutions are addressed.

- Despite the best of intentions, the policies and actions directed at restoring the health of the financial system have not been consistent or transparent. It is understandable that the initial measures were ad hoc and inconsistent because the depth and breadth of the problems were not expected and there were no plans in place for addressing the problems.

- The solution must be a clear and fair plan so that financial firms, investors and consumers know what to expect when any financial institution runs into problems. Specifically, the plan must provide a process for how policymakers will address the deterioration of the financial condition of all financial firms, regardless of their size, and resolve them if they become insolvent.

- A resolution process is particularly important for the largest, most complex and interconnected institutions because they have been considered by many as “too big to fail,” at least since the early 1980s. This paper describes a resolution process that can be used for any financial firm involved in the intermediation process or payments system, but the focus is on the large, systemically important institutions. The premise of the paper is that no firm is too big to fail and that resolving a large failed firm is the best solution for the economy.

Principles for a Resolution Framework

- A free market system requires that business owners capture the profits from their successes and bear the costs of their failures. Firms that meet the market test will grow, while those that do not will shrink and, ultimately, must be allowed to go out of business if they fail. The consequences of failure and the resolution framework must be clearly stated and transparent so that business owners have clear expectations about the consequences of their actions.

- The resolution framework must prescribe a predefined set of rules, guided by an agreed upon set of principles. This is particularly important for financial institutions, big or small, because their success depends critically on the public’s trust that they are solvent and a viable, ongoing concern.
• There are two key principles that the resolution process should follow.
  
• First, the resolution process should minimize the cost to the overall economy.
  – When resolving an insolvent firm, it is important that it does not cause significant
    financial and economic disruptions or exacerbate current problems.
  – The process should minimize the cost of resolving an insolvency to avoid a long-term
    fiscal burden on taxpayers.
  – The relevant costs are not just the direct costs but, more importantly, the current and
    future impact on the economy and financial system.
  – The direct costs of resolving a failed bank, such as the government bearing some of the
    failed bank’s losses, is simple to add up.
  – However, minimizing the future costs on the economy and financial system, particularly
    the unintended consequences, is much more difficult.
  – To minimize the future cost to the economy, the resolution process must not create
    adverse incentives that are inconsistent with economic efficiency. Specifically, the
    resolution process must not allow a firm’s management, shareholders and creditors to
    avoid the consequences of their mistakes because it reduces market discipline, creates
    adverse incentives for firms to take too much risk, and inefficiently directs resources and
    financial capital to less-productive uses.
  – The process must be transparent and clearly stated so that everyone understands what to
    expect and the consequences of their actions. Management must know beforehand what
    will happen if they gamble and take excessive risks that turn out to have a significant,
    negative effect on the firm’s financial condition.
  – Finally, to minimize costs, the resolution process should be based on solid research and
    information about what works and what does not work. Policymakers can learn a lot
    about what will and will not be successful by looking back at previous U.S. financial
    crises, as well as at crises in other countries.

• The second principle is the resolution process must be equitable in that it is the same for all
  financial firms regardless of size or location, although it is possible that the outcome will
  differ.
  – The resolution process must provide consistent treatment of a failing institution’s
    owners, managers, employees and customers, regardless of the institution’s size,
    complexity or location.
  – When talking about equity, it is important to recognize the difference between process
    and outcome.
  – For example, if a bank is examined and found to be insolvent, the bank should go through
    the resolution process and the owners should lose their investment regardless of the
    bank’s size. The outcome may be that a relatively small bank is resolved by another
    institution purchasing its assets and assuming its deposits, while a relatively large bank is
    temporarily operated as a bridge bank.
  – In both cases, the banks go through the same process of being declared insolvent and the
    same procedures for determining how it will be resolved.
Otherwise, banks may take on excessive risks just to grow to a size large enough to receive favorable treatment, and customers may choose to go with a large bank instead of a small bank.

Options for Resolving a Failed Financial Institution

- There are several options for resolving a failed firm, but it is important to first define insolvency.
  - By definition, a firm is insolvent if its common equity capital is negative – that is, the firm’s outstanding liabilities owed to creditors is greater than the total value of its assets.
  - However, a financial firm, even if it has a positive amount of equity capital, is not viable and will fail if its liquidity is insufficient to meet its current payment obligations, either because it cannot sell its assets for enough to pay off maturing liabilities, or it loses market confidence and cannot borrow enough.
  - It is important to note that these are definitions of insolvency and are not subjective conditions, which points out that the term “too big to fail” really is a misstatement. It does not matter what size a firm is – if it is insolvent by these definitions, it has failed.

- The question becomes, what do we do when a firm fails?

- One option is for the government to allow an insolvent firm to maintain ongoing operations by providing funds to bring capital ratios up to required minimums or to meet payment obligations.
  - In this case, nothing is actually resolved, and the insolvent firm is essentially bailed out so that it can continue normal operations.
  - This option may be used for a large financial firm that is considered “too big to fail” because of concerns that it is systemically important, in the sense that other resolution methods would have large, negative spillover effects on economy.
  - Under this option, the term “too big to fail” should be restated as “too big to resolve” because of the near-term negative spillover effects and disruptions to the economy and financial system.
  - In a bailout, senior management and directors keep their jobs; current shareholders do not lose their investment, although the government may impose some restrictions on the firm’s activities and practices; and creditors do not suffer any losses.
  - A bailout is the worst option in terms of the first principle of minimizing costs.
  - While a bailout may temporarily stabilize current economic conditions or not immediately cause further problems, it sets the stage for significant future problems. In a bailout, senior management, directors and current shareholders stand to reap any gains that may result, which weakens market discipline and creates the moral hazard that the firm will take too much risk.
  - Bailouts are also inequitable because they are used only for the “too big to fail” firms and not for smaller firms that are not expected to cause spillover effects if other resolution methods are used.

- Alternatively, bank regulators have for years used a variety of options to resolve insolvent banks. These options include:
liquidation,
- arranging for the sale of a failed bank’s assets and assumption of its liabilities by another institution,
- or operating the bank for a short period of time through open-bank assistance or as a bridge bank or conservatorship until the bank can be sold to another bank or group of private investors.

• When most people think of a firm as failing, they generally think the firm is shut down and liquidated.
  - In a bank liquidation, the FDIC is appointed as a receiver and it pays off insured depositors up to the deposit insurance limit.
  - Uninsured depositors are generally paid partial amounts based on expected recoveries.
  - The FDIC maximizes the value of the assets by selling them or holding on to them and working them out. The proceeds from the assets are used to first pay remaining amounts owed to uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors, and if anything is left over, to shareholders.
  - Because the firm is insolvent, the uninsured creditors will suffer some losses, and they may have to wait for a long time to receive their final payouts.
  - While liquidation strongly enforces market discipline and does not promote moral hazard, it tends to be the most disruptive option for resolving a big or small financial firm, and therefore is the least desirable choice.
  - This option is disruptive for individuals and business customers because they tend to hold short-term instruments, such as deposits and commercial paper, for making payments or as a temporary way of storing their funds. Many business customers also have counterparty arrangements, such as derivatives contracts, that would go into default when the bank is liquidated.

• The resolution method used most often is a purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction, where the FDIC as receiver finds another bank to purchase the insolvent bank’s assets and assume its liabilities.
  - In terms of the direct costs to the government, this is typically the least-cost resolution method because the FDIC may receive a premium from the acquiring bank. And even if the FDIC has to pay the acquiring bank to assume the liabilities, it is often less costly than paying off insured depositors and having to manage and liquidate the failed bank’s assets.
  - More importantly, though, it generally has the least negative impact on the economy.
  - Short-term creditors and counterparties have immediate access to all insured deposits and at least a large portion of uninsured obligations, while borrowers continue to have access to credit.
  - In addition, because management and directors are replaced and shareholders lose their investment, a P&A transaction does not reduce market discipline or create adverse incentives for bank management and shareholders.

• While a P&A transaction is often the best option for most failed banks, it generally is not the best option if one of the largest financial institutions fails because it creates even larger companies that pose even greater systemic risks to the economy.
A major difficulty in the current financial crisis has been that some institutions are so large and complex that resolving them when they fail is complicated and disruptive no matter what option is used.

Only another institution in the same size range would have the capacity and resources to purchase the assets and assume the liabilities of another large institution.

Indeed, over the past year, there have been several examples of large institutions taking over other large, problem institutions. It only makes sense that if institutions can get “too big to fail,” then all else held constant, the resolution process should not result in even larger institutions.

The final option, which is the most feasible for a large, complex financial institution that fails, is to run it temporarily as a conservatorship or bridge organization.

- Clearly, a liquidation would be too disruptive to the economy.
- This option also provides time for potential acquirers of the institution or its parts to conduct the necessary due diligence.
- The institution would then be privatized as soon as it is economically feasible.
- As will be discussed below, management, shareholders, and creditors would be forced to bear the full cost of their actions and positions they have taken to maintain market discipline and economic efficiency.

One of the difficulties with all of these options is that while there are time-tested, fast resolution processes in place for depository institutions, today’s largest financial institutions are conglomerate financial holding companies with many financial subsidiaries that are not banks.

- The bank subsidiaries could be placed into FDIC receivership, but the only other option under current law for the holding company and other subsidiaries is a bankruptcy process.
- Bankruptcy proceedings can take a long time to complete – sometimes years – which works well for a nonfinancial firm because it can continue normal operations while in bankruptcy.
- It does not work for financial firms, however, because they have a variety of complex, short-term liabilities and counterparty arrangements that customers depend on for maintaining daily operations. A long, drawn-out bankruptcy proceeding would prevent customers and counterparties from having access to their funds, which would cause significant economic disruptions.
- In addition, the cornerstone of a financial institution’s franchise value is trust in its viability as an ongoing concern, and that trust is sure to quickly erode in a long, drawn-out bankruptcy proceeding.
- The difficulty in resolving failed holding companies quickly and in a way that minimizes the disruption to the economy is why the Treasury secretary recently proposed a resolution process for systemically important financial holding companies.

Enacting a resolution process for financial companies is clearly important, but the supervisory authorities do not need to wait for it to happen and should act immediately to resolve a large financial company should one fail.
A Proposed Resolution Process

- The resolution process discussed below is applicable to any financial firm that is part of the intermediation process or payments system, but in light of the current financial crisis, the focus is on systemically important financial institutions that are found to be insolvent.

- To prevent systemic disruptions to the economy, a failed institution should be allowed to continue its operations through a bridge institution or conservatorship so that all essential services and operations would go on as normal.
  - Because the firm is insolvent, it would need additional capital to continue operating.
  - To recapitalize the firm, the government could provide the capital in exchange for preferred shares, convertible to common stock upon sale.

- In general, the supervisory authorities would not have the authority to declare the institution insolvent. Thus, to ensure that management and shareholders bear the costs of their actions and investment decisions, the government’s investment would be conditional on:
  - Replacement of the senior management and board of directors that led the firm to failure.
  - Existing shareholders providing the government warrants to purchase all outstanding shares, with the amount exercised determined by the net costs of resolving the firm.
  - While shareholders may be reluctant to agree to these conditions, in most cases, they would have little choice given the immediate need for liquidity and capital assistance.

- The specific steps to be taken would depend on several factors, such as the type of financial organization and the supervisor’s existing legal authority.
  - For example, if a holding company’s primary asset is an insured bank and the bank and holding company become insolvent, the bank could be closed and the FDIC could set up a bridge bank.
  - In this case, the holding company would also fail, and the supervisory authorities could take actions to mitigate the impact on the rest of the economy.

- The most difficult part of resolving these large firms without a new resolution process is how to make creditors bear the cost of their positions.
  - Ideally, when a firm fails, all existing obligations would be addressed and dealt with according to the covenants and contractual priorities set up for each type of debt.
  - Insured creditors would have immediate access to their funds, while other creditors would have immediate access to maturing funds with the potential for haircuts, depending on expected recoveries, any collateral protection and likely market impact.
  - However, this is difficult because it would require negotiating with groups of creditors, unless there’s a process that allows regulatory authorities to declare a nonbank financial firm insolvent.

- Regardless of how the firm is resolved, it is critical to make quick decisions on how creditors will be treated.
- Short-term liabilities in particular would need to be addressed immediately because of their importance in meeting the creditors’ daily payment obligations and operations needs.
- Quick decisions also need to be made on all counterparty arrangements because of the widespread impact that uncertainty about their status or default would have on their counterparties.
- So that unsecured creditors bear the cost of their decisions and market discipline is maintained, the resolution authorities should consider leaving these creditors standing in line behind more senior creditors as the claims on the bank are resolved.
- However, the authorities would also need to assess the market impact – specifically, whether the losses associated with this outcome would lead to a loss of confidence in financial markets and serious funding problems that would threaten the viability of other financial firms.

- In a severe financial crisis, such as is occurring today, it may be necessary to honor short-term liabilities and/or all counterparty arrangements to prevent a systemic disruption to the economy.
  - However, this guarantee should be considered as a “systemic” exception to the normal process.
  - To limit the use of this exception to truly systemic situations, Congress should enact an approval process similar to the systemic exception for banks as specified in the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act.
  - This exception requires approval by two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board, two-thirds of the FDIC Board and the secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the president.
  - In addition, though the extension of government guarantees and the resulting reduction in market discipline should generally be avoided, extension of the same guarantees would need to be made to every other institution. Otherwise, failed institutions would have a competitive advantage over sound institutions, which clearly violates the principle of equitable treatment.

- Another key part of the resolution is the bad assets need to be taken off the balance sheet of the failed institution at realistic market values.
  - One option is to place the bad assets in a separate asset management company, resulting in two new entities often referred to as a “good bank” and “bad bank.”
  - Alternatively, the FDIC or Treasury as the receiver could take the bad assets and work them out.
  - After writing off the bad assets, the government would provide the good bank with enough capital so that it can become a profitable ongoing concern and attractive to private investors for eventual reprivatization.
  - Any recoveries from the bad bank would first go toward paying off the costs of the government, and any proceeds left over would be distributed according to the priority of remaining claimants.

- The separation of the bad assets is critical for creating a forward-looking process for recovery and the eventual reprivatization of the good bank.
When a bank has a large share of nonperforming assets, they remain a burden when they are left on the balance sheet, even if they are written down appropriately. For example, they still have to be funded even though they are not producing income, they create uncertainty about the bank’s financial condition, and they divert a lot of management’s attention from more productive activities for the future growth and profitability of the bank.

In addition, the business objectives and the skills necessary for managing bad assets and recovering their maximum value is very different from the objectives and necessary skills for running an ongoing financial firm.

In other words, the goal of the good bank is to attract new customers and expand operations, while the goal of the bad bank is to get rid of customers and wind down the operations.

As part of the reprivatization process, the supervisory authorities should consider breaking up or selling off operations and independent subsidiaries where possible.

The growth of firms into “too big to fail” institutions has created significant market discipline problems.

In addition, if such a firm were to fail, it may also be an indication that it is too large and complex to manage well.

How Do We Know the Resolution Process Will Work?

A variety of concerns has been raised about letting the largest financial firms fail. These concerns are legitimate and it is clear that any solution will be difficult and costly. However, the resolution process being advocated here has a record of success elsewhere.

First, the proposed resolution process is exactly what the Swedes did to solve an equally severe banking crisis that they had in the early 1990s (see attachment “Swedish Response to 1990s Banking Crisis” for a more detailed description of the Swedish crisis and resolution process).

The economic situation in Sweden was similar to today’s, and their financial system was dominated by six large banks that accounted for 90 percent of the industry’s assets.

Sweden took decisive steps to identify losses in its major financial institutions.

The viable Swedish banks were soon recapitalized, largely through private sources, and public authorities quickly took over two large insolvent banks and spun off their bad assets to be managed within a separate entity.

Sweden was able to quickly restore confidence in its financial system, and although it took several years to work down and sell off all of the bad assets, there was essentially no net cost to the taxpayers.

Creditors, however, were fully protected because the supervisory authorities were concerned about the systemic consequences of imposing losses on uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors.

Some people do not think that the Swedish situation is a valid comparison because it dealt with only six banks. In addition, some argue that the Swedish system was much less complex, and that the government primarily had to work out commercial real estate loans,
not the complex financial assets, such as structured securities and derivatives, that would have to be worked out today if a large financial institution was allowed to fail. While these concerns are valid, it should be noted that:
- Although the United States has several thousand banks, only 19 banks have more than $100 billion of assets, and that after supervisory authorities evaluate their condition, it is likely that only a few would have to be resolved.
- It is actually very difficult to work out problems on real estate assets, and it is not necessarily more difficult to work out even complex securities.

- As an aside, an additional lesson that can be learned from Sweden is that a resolution process is much more likely to succeed if it has broad political support and is structured to be independent of the political process.
  - The plan should be put largely under the control of independent supervisory agencies.
  - Political involvement should be confined largely to specifying the program’s goals and basic rules.
  - The Swedes also found that a commitment to providing the supervisory authority the funds necessary for resolutions reduces the need for political involvement.

- A second example is this is essentially the process the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) used to deal with banking problems in the United States in the 1930s.
  - The RFC began by examining problem banks and writing down the bad assets to realistic economic values.
  - It then made any needed and appropriate changes in bank management and provided public equity capital as needed.
  - Finally, it returned the banks to private ownership and essentially recovered all of its costs.

- A final example is the failure of Continental Illinois National Bank and its holding company in 1984. This is a good comparison because it is an example of a holding company resolution using preferred stock and warrants as described in the proposed process. In addition, it is an example of a resolution of a large, complex, interconnected holding company.
  - Continental Illinois was the largest U.S. commercial and industrial lender and the seventh-largest U.S. bank. It had 57 offices in 14 states and 29 foreign countries, a network of 2,300 domestic and international correspondent relationships, and a separate function for making residential and commercial real estate loans. It also provided specialized services to a variety of companies.
  - The attached document, “Assistance for Continental Illinois,” provides details about the process used to resolve the bank and holding company.
  - The result was that the bank and holding company management were replaced, the holding company shareholders lost their entire investment, and the bank was restored to sound condition and returned to private ownership.
  - As in Sweden, Continental Illinois’ creditors were fully protected because of concerns about the systemic consequences of imposing losses on uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors.
Another concern that has been raised about letting the largest financial firms fail is that it nationalizes these institutions. As part of this concern, it is also often pointed out that government officials may not be effective managers of private business concerns.

- In the proposed process, no firm would be nationalized.
- Nationalization is the process of the government taking over a going concern with the intent of continued ownership.
- Though a bridge institution is the most likely outcome for a large financial firm that fails, the goal is for the firm to be reprivatized as quickly as possible, subject to the government not wasting taxpayer funds.
- In addition, subject to regulatory agency oversight, the bridge firm would be managed by private sector managers selected for their experience in operating well-run, large, complex organizations.

Some opponents to the proposed process also claim it would be very difficult to take over these firms and bring in new management because they are too complex to manage, as well as there is not enough people with the required knowledge, experience, and skills to fill the open positions.

- The Continental Illinois example shows it is possible bring in a management team with experience running large, complex organizations.
- In addition, while the institution might be complex, a new management team is clearly better than leaving the institution under the control of the management team that caused it to fail in the first place.
- More generally, it is hard to believe that there is not enough talent, either from the United States or other countries, to run these organizations.
Assistance for Continental Illinois

I. Problems at Continental Illinois

- In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Continental Illinois pursued a strategy of rapid growth in commercial lending, particularly energy lending, that was largely funded by purchased money.
- It became the seventh-largest U.S. bank and largest commercial lender in the United States.
- Penn Square’s failure in 1982, LDC debt problems and the downturns in energy markets led to declining asset quality and earnings at Continental from 1982 into 1984 and forced Continental to rely heavily on foreign money markets for funding.
- News stories in May 1984 on Continental’s problems started a run by foreign depositors on Continental, and by May 19, they had withdrawn more than $6 billion.
- The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago began lending through the discount window to cover the lost deposits, and Continental put together a $4.5 billion loan package funded by 16 large U.S. banks, but these steps did not stop the deposit run.

II. Interim Financial Assistance

- On May 17, 1984, the FDIC, OCC and Federal Reserve announced an interim assistance package for Continental, which was based on the FDIC’s open bank assistance authority.
- The FDIC explicitly guaranteed all deposits at Continental in order to keep a liquidity crisis from spreading to other U.S. banks, prevent significant losses at the many banks that had correspondent accounts at Continental and avoid other negative effects in U.S. financial markets.
- A $2 billion capital infusion for Continental was arranged in the form of interest-bearing subordinated notes, with the FDIC providing $1.5 billion and the remaining $500 million provided by seven of the largest U.S. banks.
- The Federal Reserve agreed to meet any liquidity needs of Continental, and a group of 24 major U.S. banks also agreed to provide more than $5.3 billion in funding on an unsecured basis until a permanent solution was developed.
- The FDIC was unable to find any merger partners for Continental during this interim period, presumably due to Continental’s asset problems, substantial litigation and funding issues, along with the limited number of merger partners under Illinois’ interstate banking restrictions.

III. Permanent Financial Assistance

- In July 1984, a permanent assistance plan was put in place for Continental.
• Continental’s top management and board of directors were removed. John Swearingen, former chairman of Standard Oil of Indiana, became CEO of the holding company, and William Ogden, a former vice chairman of Chase Manhattan, became CEO of the bank.

• The FDIC assumed $3.5 billion of Continental’s discount window borrowings from the Federal Reserve.

• In exchange for assuming this debt, the FDIC received $3.5 billion (adjusted book value) of assets from Continental. This consisted of poor quality loans that Continental had already written down to $3 billion (these loans were further written down to $2 billion in this transaction, and Continental was forced to take a charge of $1 billion against capital) and a note from Continental for $1.5 billion, which Continental could repay within three years by giving the FDIC additional loans of Continental’s choice with a book value of $1.5 billion.

• To offset the $1 billion charge to Continental’s capital that was required by the loan sale, the FDIC infused $1 billion in capital into Continental. The FDIC’s capital infusion consisted of $720 million of permanent, convertible, nonvoting, junior perpetual preferred stock in Continental’s holding company (this amounted to a 79.9 percent ownership stake in Continental if converted) and another $280 million of permanent, adjustable-rate, cumulative preferred stock in the holding company. This assistance was provided through the holding company rather than the bank because covenants in the holding company’s debt instruments required debtholder approval to sell the bank or to inject capital directly into it.

• The FDIC also received an option designed to compensate it for any losses, carrying costs or collection costs on the loans it acquired.

• The $2 billion in subordinated notes issued under the interim plan was repaid.

• To economize on FDIC staff and to provide additional expertise, the loan liquidation involved a combination of FDIC personnel, Continental employees under incentive contracts and hired specialists.

IV. Return to Private Ownership and the Cost of Resolving Continental Illinois

• In a series of sales that took place between December 1986 and June 1991, the FDIC sold all of its preferred stock and the stock acquired through its option.

• The shareholders in Continental’s holding company lost their entire investment once the FDIC exercised the option it received as compensation for loan liquidation losses.

• From the sale of stock, which completed the return of Continental to private ownership, the FDIC had a net gain of $200 million over its initial $1 billion capital investment, and it also received more than $200 million in dividends on this stock.

• Overall, the loss on the FDIC’s books from Continental’s failure was $1.1 billion, which is equal to 3.28 percent of Continental’s assets at the time of resolution.
Swedish Response to 1990s Banking Crisis

- Economic and financial market conditions leading up to the Swedish banking crisis were very similar to the conditions leading up to the current crisis.
  - Deregulation of financial markets (elimination of quantitative controls on bank lending, ceilings on interest rates and restrictions on capital flows) is similar to recent deregulation (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) and financial innovations (securitization, derivatives).
  - Large inflow of foreign capital and expansion of domestic lending and debt.
  - Low/negative real interest rates.
  - Strong growth in consumption and real estate investment and low savings rate.
  - Sharp increases in asset prices (stocks and real estate).

- Although the economic downturn leading to the crisis was precipitated by rising real interest rates, the impact on the economy was similar to the current crisis.
  - Stock and real estate prices fell sharply (tangible asset values fell about 30 percent).
  - Bankruptcies increased dramatically (bankruptcies grew about 20 percent, 40 percent and 70 percent in 1989, 1990 and 1991, respectively).
  - Consumption fell and the savings rate rose from being slightly negative at the end of the 1980s to 8 percent in 1993.
  - Residential real estate investment froze.

- Goal of financial support and recovery plan – temporary government investment in banks where necessary, but banks were to be placed in private ownership as soon as economically feasible.

- Political support – the program had broad political support, which was important for quick decisive actions and providing the national leadership necessary for public support.

- Political independence – a Bank Support Authority, separate from the financial supervisory authority and central bank, was established under the Ministry of Finance to manage the program. The Bank Support Authority (BSA) had open-ended funding and was free from political interference in making decisions, although the BSA worked closely with the supervisory authority and central bank.

- Debt guarantees
  - All bank depositors, counterparties, and other creditors were fully protected from future losses, including foreign creditors (accounted for about 40 percent of bank funding).
  - Guarantees were eliminated when the crisis ended in the mid-1990s, and a bank-financed deposit insurance system was created (Sweden did not have deposit insurance prior to the crisis).

- Transparency
  - The government was very open about the process.
  - A valuation board composed of real estate experts was used to ensure consistent and realistic asset values, and asset values that had declined were promptly written down.

- Bank recapitalization
  - A bank’s future viability was estimated using a quantitative model of profitability subject to various economic scenarios. Banks were placed in one of three categories based on their viability in the worst-case scenario, which determined the type of government support they would receive.
  - Category 1 – Capital deteriorates but remains above minimum requirements.
The bank was expected to raise additional capital, with temporary government guarantees available if necessary to help maintain public confidence.

- **Category 2** – Capital falls below minimum requirements but is expected to rise above the minimum in a reasonable period of time.
  Shareholders were expected to contribute additional capital, with the government contributing capital as necessary to meet operating requirements. Government received preferred shares.

- **Category 3** – Capital becomes negative and bank is unlikely to become profitable.
  Bank declared insolvent and government resolves the bank in the least-costly manner, including the possibility of liquidation.

- Good bank, bad bank model – used for banks that received government support and for insolvent banks. Nonperforming loans were transferred to work-out companies at realistic market values. The good bank is provided additional capital as necessary for sound operations and managed by financial market professionals with clear business objectives.

- Shareholders were not protected (except for one bank in which the government was the majority shareholder, as noted below).
  - Government’s preferred shares were offset by a corresponding reduction in private shares.
  - The government also received voting power that would grow over time, so the government would eventually become the majority shareholder if the support was large enough and maintained for a long period of time.

- Banks that received assistance were given conditions to make operational improvements. Government representatives were placed on the bank boards to ensure compliance.

- **Results**
  - Among the six major banks, Nordbanken (Category 2) received government capital (the government was already the majority shareholder and it also purchased the outstanding privately held shares); Gota (Category 3) failed, was taken over by the government and eventually merged with Nordbanken; and Sparbanken received a government loan.
  - The banking crisis was largely over by 1996 and the banking system remained largely intact – there were no runs and few signs of a credit crunch.
  - While there is no official estimate of the cost of the support program, the most recent estimate of the net fiscal cost is that the government broke even, which is based on government outlays during the most acute phases of the crises and revenues from the sale of bad assets, preferred shares and other proceeds over the past 15 years. The initial gross fiscal cost of the support program is estimated to have been about 4 percent of GDP.
  - Ultimately, Nordbanken was largely privatized and is now part of Nordea (the government owns about 20 percent), which operates in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark.

- **Lessons learned**
  - Political consensus on a support plan is crucial.
  - Once the plan is formed and implemented, it is just as important for the process to be independent of political interference and fully transparent to the public.
  - The government officials in charge of the program must take timely and decisive actions to resolve problem firms, which is one reason political independence is important.
  - Assets must be given realistic valuations.
  - Shareholders at failing banks must lose their investment, and senior management and the board of directors must be replaced for both efficiency and equity purposes. Markets will not be efficient unless those who may benefit from taking risk actions also bear the costs.
- The program’s success also requires that the new management of the good and bad banks are financial industry professionals, are given sound business objectives and clearly understand to whom they are responsible, which is another reason why political independence is important.
REFERENCES


